Philosophy

REDD is a climate ‘solution’ implemented to avoid deforestation in Non-Annex I countries, regions that consist of Indigenous territories and other forest communities. The proposal’s objective, is to conserve forests and avoid further deforestation, in addition, the developing nation will receive funding for their collaboration with the program.

In this paper, I will discuss how Foucault’s methodology of the docile body can be expanded to include, what we will refer to as, a civilized body. This is primarily taken from the notion that Foucault’s take on techniques of discipline and the ‘correlative techniques of power’ emphasized in Discipline and Punish share important similarities with the idea of civilization and development that was taken up by governmental bodies in the United States in the 18th century. This ideal was commonly relied upon for arguments of how non-European societies were ‘behind’ European ones, but they had the capacity of being oriented towards becoming more ‘like’ them. This notion parallels Foucault’s concept of the organization of geneses. A view based on how the progress rate of societies paired with the geneses of the distinct individuals become ‘correlative with new techniques of power’, or modern forms of dominance and control. The notion of progress will be examined and compared to the similar views that were used to justify the United State’s government’s use of Native American boarding schools to forcibly ‘civilize’ future generations of Native Americans. By drawing primarily from David Wallace Adam’s analysis in Education for Extinction: American Indians and the Boarding School Experience 1875-1928, this paper will discuss how the institutionalized forms of disciplinary power that took place in these spaces reflects systems of power and progress. This will expand on Foucault’s analysis of the body as an object made to reflect a specific ideal of ‘utility’

I argue that Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism cannot accommodate our obligations to others. Because she holds that all of our obligations are grounded in our obligating ourselves, she is committed to the view that our obligations to others are grounded in corresponding obligations to ourselves. Yet this conclusion is objectionable on substantive moral grounds. The problem is that she embraces an egocentric conception of authority, on which we originally have the authority to obligate ourselves while others only have the authority to obligate us because we grant it to them. The solution is to adopt a more thoroughly social conception of authority and autonomy.

Counter to the widespread assumption that science should be value-free, Douglas argues that such a standard is neither adequate nor desirable. She lobbies for a new ideal in which values, including social and ethical values, serve an essential function throughout scientific inquiry, but their role is constrained at key points, thereby protecting the integrity and objectivity of science.
Framed by the history of science advising and the development of the value-free ideal, her arguments stem from both the moral responsibilities of scientists and the rational need for values in scientific reasoning. Clarifying how values should and should not be used in science, her insights sharpen the distinction between sound science and junk science, and lead to the need for greater openness on the values used in the policymaking process.


Reviewed at: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=18306

Available at: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0822960265/

Digital edition at:  http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/text-idx?c=pittpress;cc=pittpress;q1=2012;rgn=works;rgn1=citation;view=toc;idno=31735062137108

Most accounts of research ethics have two unfortunate characteristics:  1)  The account of the responsibilities of scientists is a long list of various responsibilities, often with tensions among them, with little or no substantive guidance for how to consider such tensions (e.g., Resnick 1998, chap. 4, IoM/NRC 2002); and 2) the discussion of the responsibilities of scientists with respect to society is woefully thin and inadequate (as noted by Pimple 2002).  This paper aims to correct both of these flaws by providing a more general map of the moral terrain for scientists, one which allows scientists to assess when some responsibilities trump other responsibilities.  It also has the benefit of being conceptually more coherent, and thus easier to keep track of in the daily practice of doing science.  Finally, it also makes clearer what responsibilities scientists have to the general society in which they work, and thus what kinds of limitations on doing science can legitimately arise from such responsibilities.

The terms “objectivity” and “objective” are among the most used yet ill-defined terms in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Common to all the various usages is the rhetorical force of “I endorse this and you should too,” or to put it more mildly, that one should trust the outcome of the objectivity-producing process. The persuasive endorsement and call to trust provide some conceptual coherence to objectivity, but the reference to objectivity is hopefully not merely an attempt at persuasive endorsement. What, in addition to epistemological endorsement, does objectivity carry with it? Drawing on recent historical and philosophical work, I articulate eight operationally accessible and distinct senses of objectivity. While there are links among these senses, providing cohesion to the concept, I argue that none of the eight senses is strictly reducible to the others, giving objectivity its irreducible complexity.

There are two fundamental bases for the moral responsibilities of scientists: role responsibilities and general responsibilities. Scientists have role responsibilities that come with being a scientist; these include the burdens of governance in the scientific community and upholding the ethical standards internal to science. The role that scientists play, however, does not shield them from the general moral responsibilities that we all share. Of particular importance to scientists are the responsibilities not to be reckless or negligent, i.e. not to ignore or fail to reflect on the risks inherent in scientific research for society at large. These general responsibilities take on an increased urgency given the potentially widespread impact of scientific work. If scientists choose to neglect these responsibilities, they must be taken up by others, thus threatening the scientists’ autonomy.

Despite the prevailing norm that expert reasoning should be as free from ethical and social influences as possible, it is argued that this norm is an undesirable norm for experts and needs to be replaced. Because of the importance of expertise in public life, experts have a responsibility to consider carefully the consequences of error when making empirical claims. This responsibility is no threat to expertise, because it is dubious that the authority of expertise rests on following internal disciplinary norms only, and because the integrity of expertise can still be protected from politicization by following a different norm, one that requires values serve only to weigh the importance of uncertainty. These new norms provide a clearer understanding of bias in experts. Finally, the new norms also clarify what should be at stake in technically based public issues, which is both what the available evidence indicates and what consequences of error we are willing to risk.

The risk regulation process has been traditionally conceived as having two components: a consultation of the experts concerning the magnitude of risk (risk assessment) and a negotiated decision on whether and how to reduce that risk (risk management). The first component is generally thought to be free of the contentious value judgments that often characterize the second component. In examining the recent controversy over dioxin regulation, I argue that the first component is not value-free. I review three areas of science important to dioxin regulation: epidemiological studies, laboratory animal studies, and biochemical studies. I show how problems of interpretation arise for each area of science that prevent a clear-cut answer to the question: what dose of dioxins is safe for humans? Because of significant uncertainties in how to interpret these studies, there is significant risk that one will err in the interpretation. In order to judge what risk of error to accept, one needs to consider and weigh the consequences of one’s judgments, whether epistemic or non-epistemic. Weighing non-epistemic consequences requires the use of non-epistemic values. Thus, non-epistemic values, of the kind that are important in risk management, have an important and legitimate role to play in the judgments required to perform and interpret the dioxin studies. The risk assessment component of the risk regulation process (or any similar consultation of the scientific experts) cannot be claimed to be value-free, and the process must be altered to accommodate a value-laden science.

Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the “external” parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. Illustrated with examples from dioxin studies, I show how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results.